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SOME PROBLEMS WITH ECONOMIC MODELS
INVOLVING AIR POLLUTION
John Hoag and J. David Reed
Department of Economics
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio

Abstract
In this paper we consider how economic models have
interfaced with environmental problems in three areas:
optimal air quality standards, pollution control
policy and growth with pollution.
The focus is on
what has been done and what should be done.
1.

INTRODUCTION

In that case, the meaning of optimal level of

The objective of this paper is to consider

pollution is determined by the model in which

three areas where economic models or concepts

the concept is developed.

interface with environment issues.

then, how should the model be specified?

In the

The question is
But

paper we examine how the problems have been

there are also some policy issues.

handled and suggest problems and shortcomings

target level could be determined, how could it

inherent in these approaches.

be translated into terms which could be useful

The issue is

that the twin goals of sound economics and

in the field?

potential policy use must be considered

in this section.

together.

The alternative is either economic

include at least the following elements.

The three

Should the model be static or dynamic, should

areas we will consider are the meaning of

the relevant level of pollution be a stock or

optimal pollution levels, current pollution

a flow (an allied policy question is whether

control policies, and pollution in the con
text of growth.
2.

These issues will be considered

The question of model specification seems to

models with no operational significance or
policy without economic foundation.

If this

the pollution should be measured at the source
or at some point where the pollution from

OPTIMAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS

several sources mix).

Is the important issue

In this section we wish to consider the con

how much pollution there is or is the issue

cept of the optimal level of pollution.

how much damage the pollution does?

The

concept is prevalent in the economics litera

precisely is pollution?

ture dealing with environmental matters, and

level of pollution, in fact, optimal?

we wish to take a closer look at what is meant
by the term.

The concept seems to be a con

What,

In what sense is the

The question of whether or not the model in
which the optimal level of pollution is to be

cept which exists in the context of some

determined is static or dynamic seems to

models and seems to have welfare implications,
it is a target that ought to be attained.

revolve around whether or not there are fac
tors in the model (in fact the world) which
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would cause the optimal level of pollution to
change over time.

Such factors might include

changes in technology or unemployment.

No matter what we decide about the type of
standard we use to measure pollution, we must

As

be concerned about where the measurement of

the technology to abate pollution improves,

pollution will occur.

the optimal level of pollution could drop.

effluent standards should be enforced (and

In other words, the optimal level may be con

measured) at the source.

strained by what is technologically possible.

case that the pollution is caused by a mixing

Unemployment may be a factor if pollution

of effluents, the source may not be well de

levels are kept so low that unemployment

fined.

It seems likely that
Although in the

Ambient air conditions may be meas

(reduced output) occurs in excess of what had

ured nearly anywhere.

been anticipated (this may be more a matter

where to measure may make a substantial dif

But the choice of

of misspecification of the objective of the

ference.

model, i.e., unemployment should get a rela
tively heavier weight in the objectives of

standards is to guarantee that nowhere in the
air shed (or region or nation) does air

the model than it in fact was given).

quality fall below certain levels, we must

If the

In fact, if the aim of the air

optimal level of pollution seems to rest upon

measure air quality at' many points.

other variables in the model which are being

we do then?

simultaneously chosen with pollution, then a
dynamic model is indicated.

the air standards are satisfied if nine sta

Do we average?

What do

Do we say that

tions in ten measure acceptable levels of

A more difficult issue is whether effluent or

pollution?

ambient measures are appropriate for charac

ambient) we should measure pollution at the

Perhaps (for either effluent or

terization of optimal pollution standards.

point where damage occurs.

While it is surely true that ambient air con

number of points where damage occurs might be

But since the

ditions could be generated from knowledge of

very great, the costs would be prohibitive.

effluents, atmospheric conditions, and the

The optimal solution (where to measure) will

ability of the air to self clean, any rela

depend upon whether effluent standards or

tionship certainly is not constantly the same.

ambient standards are being used and whether

It is presumably true that by controlling

the goal of the standards is to control pol

effluents one could, except under perverse
conditions, control ambient pollution levels.

lution everywhere in the air shed or just at
selected points.

Thus, it may not matter which of the two are

Another issue is whether the optimal stand

used.

ards should be national or regional.

The real issue is whether the damage

To

that pollution does seems to be due more to

assert that national standards should prevail

the stock of pollution or to the flow.

seems to ignore the possibility that there

Con

cern about the damage that pollution does sug

may be reasons for regional economic spe

gests that our main concern should not be the

cialization or pecularities associated with

optimal amount of pollution in the air but the
damage that the optimal pollution does (we

certain air sheds which may require special
allowances for air quality standards.

might, in fact, define a pollutant to be any

Exactly how finely the area should be divided

effluent which causes injury) . It is almost
impossible to measure the damage that pollu

probably depends on the air shed, political
reality and certain economic facts.

tion does, but it is also surely true that
more pollution means more damage.

The bottom line on optimal pollution levels

Thus,

requires some understanding of what optimal

though our ultimate concern is damage, we
should stick with pollution controls since we
can measure pollution, and cutbacks in pollu
tion mean cutbacks in damage. We should note,
as Coase (3) does, that reduction in pollution
does impose costs on (causes damage to) the
polluter.
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means.
In what way is the standard an opti
mal standard? Since the goal of an economic
system is to provide for the needs of its
citizens, it seems likely that the best
measure of optimality would be whether the
air quality standards provide a level of

pollution and allow a level of output so that

standards were used by Kohn in the absence of

that welfare of the society is as great as

"official standards").

possible given the productive capacity of the

interesting and innovative methodology.

system.

allows the planner to observe the impact on

Obviously all the usual comments con

This is surely an
It

cerning social welfare apply to this case.

the economy of various pollution standards.

The EPA is charged with the responsibility of

The model's linear nature is surely a draw

setting standards for several different pollu

back but one which is fully recognized by the

tants.

author.

They have chosen to do this by speci

A more serious problem is that the

consumption sector is ignored.

fying standards for the individual pollutant.

Such a model

To correctly set such standards, they must

could be used as a tool to help establish

contend with the optimal issues discussed

optimal standards.

above as well as the following.

The second paper is by Russell (16).

Since some

Russell

pollutants are obtained by mixing of others

reports on work (in progress at the time) at

(smog) , the standards cannot be set independ

Resources for the Future.

ently.

regional model where the objective is to

The agency establishing such optimal

The model is a

pollution levels must take into consideration

minimize the cost of pollution in the region

the various ways that pollutants can interact
to form new noxious material.

subject to constraints requiring a minimum
"bill of goods" to be produced and also
requires that ambient environmental condi

Some work has been done using models to
help measure pollution and costs.
on a couple of those efforts here.

tions be satisfied.

We report

The model covers air and

water pollution as well as solid waste and is

Note that

though they do not directly address the issue

to be used in a hypothetical area which in

of optimal level of pollution, the authors
have had to contend with the measurement issue

cludes a few point sources. Specific meas
ures of pollution are suggested for the

which is at the base of the optimal pollution

model (biochemical oxygen demand and heat

problem. We will discuss a paper by Kohn (9)
and one by Russell (16).

residuals for water; SO,, concentrations and
particulates for air; ash, sludge and slur
ries for land).

Kohn (9) wishes to minimize the cost of con
trolling pollution levels.

distributional effects could also be includ

He uses a linear

ed.

programming model to find the minimum cost of

involved with measurement.

levels of output and air pollution standards.

Again, the model

could be used as a planning tool for agencies

The model was reformed and for a given cost,

whose job is to establish optimal pollution

pollution levels were fixed for all but one
pollutant and the minimum level of the remain

rules since the impact of the various rules
could be simulated with this model.

Such calcula

Again,

the consumption sector does not play a role
in this model.

tions were carried out using information from
the St. Louis area.

The model is an effort to confront the

policy issues and solve the thorny issues

controlling pollution levels given certain

ing pollution was calculated.

Constraints reflecting the

These calculations were

3.

carried out for various levels of cost and

PROBLEMS IN POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY

constant cost of control curves were derived.

The initial question that appears crucial

These curves turned out essentially to be con

when considering control of pollution in

vex to the origin. To some extent the meas
urement issues were faced in the field in the

impose controls in an attempt to abate the

collection of data.

degradation of the environment.

society is what is the appropriate level to

But the model had to be

constructed so that it was consistent with the
information collected.

In the con

text of air pollution, the major legislation
in effect at this time is contained in the

Further since Kohn

imposed air pollution standards, the issue of

Clean Air Act of 1970.

how those standards were set was faced prior

charges the EPA with the responsibility to

to the modeling (actually some arbitrary

determine rational primary and secondary air
207

Basically, the act

quality standards for each air pollutant.

it is clear the unit responsible must imple

Given these standards, the EPA is assigned

ment certain policies to achieve the desired

the role of assuring the standards are
attained. The EPA is empowered to designate

results.

air basins to aid in their charge.

ries.

Such

The policies currently available

do appear to fall into three major catego
These are 1) regulation; 2) user

Once

charges; and 1) contracts and redefinition of

the standards have been set and the air basins

property rights associated with environmental

basins may be interstate or intrastate.

designated, the act requires that each state

goods.

be responsible for assuring the standards are

briefly discussed and certain questions and/

met throughout its boundaries.

or problems inherent in each will be pre
sented.

A recent article by Blair, Fesmire and Kaser-

The following discussion draws

heavily on the works of Majoue (12) and

man (1) points out some inherent problems in
such an arrangement.

Each of these categories will be

Wenner (17).

The basic issue raised

is the appropriateness of defining and impos
ing national standards on what may be best

Regulation is the primary policy tool in use

viewed as a regional public good.

take the form of direct intervention or sub

in the U.S. today.

It is

While regulation may

argued that even if national standards were

sidy, it normally occurs in the form of

implemented in some optimal manner, the

effluent or emission standards.

results would most likely be suboptimal since

such standards will be based on the optimal

the marginal costs and marginal benefits of

level of environmental quality or at least

pollution abatement surely vary between

an explicitly stated ambient quality stand

regions.

ard.

In addition, there is concern that

In theory,

However, regardless of the process of

the Clean Air Act precludes or hinders the

establishing a total allowable quantity of

flow of capital to areas that offer the great

pollution that is permissible, major prob

est rate of return due to the Act's require

lems arise when the regulatory agency begins

ment that in areas where the air quality

to allocate this total residual among the

exceeds current standards, significant degra

different dischargers.

dation to lower levels is precluded.

(total cost minimization) requires that the
marginal costs of reduction be equal over all

Counterarguments in favor of federal control
also exist.

Optimal reduction

firms involved.

One such point made is that if

Two basic problems are

you grant the authority to a region, state or
locality to set standards, then it is quite

inherent here. First, if the regulation is
in the form of across-the-board reductions,

possible that no abatement or only limited

then no allowance is being made for cost

abatement will occur.

differential.

This is based on sug

Such reductions are unlikely

gestions that the pressure brought by special

to yield minimum cost solutions.

interest groups receives greater weight as

tively, the cutbacks could be handled on a

Alterna

the level of the governmental unit decreases.

firm-by-firm basis to assure equal marginal

Federal control, it is argued, would be less

control cost.

sensitive to such pressures.

requires detailed cost information from each

There is also

However, such a procedure

firm which is costly and time consuming, and

the issue of what importance or weight should
be given to the preferences of individuals

in many cases may be next to impossible to

who do not live in a particular air basin.
If quality of air is viewed as a national

obtain.

social good as a consequence of interdepend

nological or other changes occurred and
realignments made to keep marginal conditions

Individual firm cost information

would also have to be reevaluated when tech

encies and air flow problems, then national
control may be needed to fully account for
social choice.

in line. Essentially, the argument associ
ated with effluent control is that given a
set of standards and sufficient enforcement,

Regardless of what level is appropriate to

effluent standards can always be found to

vest the responsibility of pollution control,

meet the desired level of the environmental
208

objective.

However, there is little reason

to expect a least cost solution.

areas.

Finally,

Under such circumstances the environ

mental quality will decrease unless there is

under a system of quotas or regulations,

a continual readjustment in the fees associ

there may be incentives for firms to lie

ated with each unit of a given substance.

about the cost of pollution.

Such continual adjustment would make planning

This is important since if cost information

by the firms extremely difficult.

is incorrectly reported to the regulations

been suggested (18) that the success of user

It has also

agency, the quotas are likely to be nonop-

fees-depends on a certain pattern of business

timal.

behavior.

Kwerel (10) argues that a system of

Yet so unpredictable are business

pollution licenses together with a subsidy

decisions, we might find that effluent fee

(per license on license capacity in excess of

simply becomes a license to pollute.

pollution) will induce the firms to tell the

Contracts and the sale of pollution rights

truth about their costs so that the optimal

represent a third set of tools for the con

level of pollution can be determined and

trol of pollution.

implemented.

rather old.

Kwerel's model is set in a game

The idea of contracts is

If the cost of reducing pollution

context and his results hold if each firm

is less than the benefits received from the

believes that the others will tell the truth

reduction in pollution, then the possibility

(there is no incentive to lie unless a firm

exists for the damaged parties to make con

believes that others lie) and upon an assumed

tracted payments to the pollutors to cover

competitive market for licenses.

the cost of abatement and benefit both par

Effluent or user charges have a simple logi

ties.

cal basis.

free-rider problem is clearly evident.

If the social cost can be esti

While the idea is quite simple, the
In

mated for different types and concentrations

addition, the informational cost may be so

of pollutants, the appropriate environmental

high as to preclude the market from ever

enforcement agency can impose a charge equal

forming.

to the marginal damage for each unit of pollu

mail exists in this situation.

Finally, the potential for black
The concept of

Given profit maximization, firms would

the sale of pollution rights is perhaps the

reduce their pollution so long as the cost of

most innovative of the tools available (5).

doing so was less than the user charge asso

This method involves setting a total amount of

ciated with discharging the marginal unit of

available pollution rights for some defined

pollution into the environment.

areas.

tant.

A major

The given amount is then placed on the

advantage of such a system is that the firms

market in an

auction and sold to the highest

would have the freedom to choose the least

bidders.

cost solution for their individual operation

charges equal the number of rights they have

Purchasers are then limited to dis

rather than having it imposed in the form of

purchased.

a specific type of treatment on in terms of a

either purchase rights from the existing

New entrants into the market can

specified percentage cutbacks in discharges.

firms, treat their own waste or choose an

In this case, for a given effluent charge,

alternative location.

The adjustment problem

the reduction in pollution is likely to be

inherent in other methods of pollution abate

achieved at least cost.

ment does not exist in this case.

While the given level

An inter

of charges may not achieve the desired reduc

esting sidelight is that groups who want an

tion in pollution, it is reasonably simple to

even cleaner environment have the option of

adjust the charges to the appropriate level.

purchasing rights and holding them off the
market.

While effluent charges have received increas
ing support as a most desirable approach for

The most often discussed problem with the sale

pollution reduction, they are not without

of pollution rights is the ability of large

certain shortcomings.

corporations to purchase rights in excess of

One such shortcoming

is that of changes over time in terms of pop

what they need and hold them in order to limit

ulation and industrial growth in certain

new entry of competitors into the area.
209

It

has also been noted in other areas where pub

Such an approach suggests that the pursuit of

lic goods have been sold at auctions (off

self-interest by parties affected not only

shore drilling) that collusion among firms

involves optimal adjustments under the rules

has occurred in an attempt to minimize the

but also investing resources to participate

cost of the rights.

in setting the rules and modifying existing

In this case the price

of the rights would not reflect accurately

rules to enhance their own benefits.

the social value of using the environment as

operational level the relevant question is

a sink for dumping waste.

less the technical aspects of the abstract

Another problem is

At the

based upon the work of Coase (3) which sug

policy models but rather the institutional

gests that imposing the full marginal cost of

means of choosing alternative instruments and

additional pollution on one firm is less than

the manner in which they are actually imple

optimal, yet such occurs if new firms attempt

mented.

ing to enter the area are limited only to the

economically, is unequally distributed over a

choices previously stated.

typical population, then bargaining would

Some redistribu

Since power, both politically and

tion of the additional cost would be pre

appear a necessity in policy solutions that

ferred.

hold any hopes of being operationally effec
tive .

Finally, the inflexibility of a fixed

amount of pollution rights may be unreasonably
based on potential changes in external condi
tions .

If such arguments are given weight in the
development of policy and policy analysis,

Having briefly discussed the major policy

then it suggests that policy analysis and

tools available for the control of environ

models need to recognize more clearly the

mental pollution and summarized some of the

interdependence of the actors involved in the

strengths and weaknesses of each, we should
note that under ideal conditions they yield

process.
General equilibrium models where all
parties are explicitly included need to

similar results in terms of meeting the stated

receive more attention.

objectives of environmental control.

gaining models must receive greater attention

The

In addition, bar

relative distribution of gains or losses to

in the work being performed in this area

the various parties may vary among the use of

rather than the almost total reliance upon

the tools but environmental effectiveness and
economic efficiency are possible under all
cases.

strictly deterministic models.

require the simultaneous use of a variety of

The technical aspects of the policy tools have
been formalized, refined and debated in the
literature for years.

Finally, the

efforts to control pollution efficiently may
methods rather than a single method of pollu
tion reduction (14), (10).

Today an increasing

4.

GROWTH AND POLLUTION

body of literature is appearing that deals

In this section we wish to consider how pol

less with the technical aspects of tools than
with the performance of those policy instru

lution and economic growth may interact.
the main, the models we will examine are

ments.
The fundamental question being raised
is whether the gools suggested above and new

optimal growth models with explicit pollution

tools currently being developed provide in

may be true that the imposition of environ
mental standards would slow the rate of
economic growth.

sectors.

some sense only a partial equilibrium solu
tion. Typically, environmental control policy
implicitly assumes that public choice con

In

This issue is of concern since it

We shall examine the contents of four papers

straints placed on the market are determined
exogenously to those bound by the constraints.
■^®t work in the area of public choice sug

in this section. The first is a determinis
tic model given by Converse (4). The second
two papers contain optimal models.

gests, to varying degrees, that policy choice

The first

optimal paper under consideration is by

and implementation are endogenous in nature
(Buchanan (2)).

D'Arge and Kogiku (6); the second is by
Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser (8), and the
210

third, by Reed and Hoag (15).

We do not claim

wastes (this actually says that consumption

that these papers exhaust the literature on

should be postponed until needed to offset

this point.

the disutility of the density of waste).

Rather they give us a flavor of

the kind of work that has been done in the
area.

In a second model, D'Arge and Kogiku bring in
the extraction of a non-renewable resource

The first model of interest is not an optimal

and results similar to the first model are

model (an optimal model is one in which some

obtained.

thing is maximized or minimized possibly sub

D'Arge and Kogiku which allows investment in

A third model is explored by

ject to constraints), but rather it is essen

recycling equipment.

tially the Solow growth model with pollution;

methods are used and several possible out

the model is reported by Converse (4).

In

comes are suggested.

the model some of the capital can be used to
treat waste.

Again optimal control
D'Arge and Kogiku sum

marize their argument by saying (p. 76)

Converse then argues if the

"Therefore, the more distasteful a degraded

rate of waste discharge is fixed (as a per

environment is compared with higher current

cent of output), then there cannot be unlim

consumption, and the smaller the natural

ited growth along balanced growth.

environment the more likely that

This

... both

result arises because the balanced growth

consumption per capita and resource extraction

rate of saving depends on the capital stock

per capita will rise through time."

and the balanced growth saving rate is
bounded.

The results which D'Arge and Kogiku report

Hence the capital stock is bounded.

depend upon the additive separable utility

In the case where a fixed percent of pollu

function.

tion must be treated, unlimited growth is
possible.

It is not clear how a more general

utility function would effect the results.

These results seem to suggest that

The assumption that the rate of growth of

if the rate of waste discharge is constrained,

population is exogenous and constant seems a

growth may stop; if the regulations simply

problem.

require some percent of the discharge to be

There is not much evidence that the

population growth has any propensity to obey

treated, growth may not be impaired.

such a requirement.

Finally, the model does

An optimal approach to the problem of waste

not include the possibilities of intervention

treatment is provided by D'Arge and Kogiku

by a government to curtail the accumulation

(6).

of waste.

They provide several models which allow

It would be of interest to see how

examination of the problem in ever increasing

governmental regulations would affect the out

detail.

come.

In all cases they assume that an

In terms of previous concerns examined

additive separable per capita utility function

in this paper, it is apparently true that

is maximized where per capita utility depends

waste is generated by consumption and produc

on per capita income, waste density and the

tion.

planning horizon.
Population growth is
assumed exogenous and the density of waste

problems are ignored except that waste is

depends on the population.

addition, this paper does not explicitly con

In the first

But locational aspects and measurement

taken to be proportional to final output.

In

model, the constraint is the equation of

sider waste to be air pollution although it is

motion for waste density.

certainly true that air pollution is one form
of waste.

Optimal conditions

are calculated according to optimal control
methods.

The precise behavior of the economy

depends on the values for the rate of growth
of population, the discount rate and the
initial value of the stock of waste density.
But for special values of population growth
and the discount rate, since waste densities
must increase over time, consumption must
increase to offset the utility lost due to

A third paper on pollution and growth is by
Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser (8).

The paper

essentially includes full discussions of two
models and an appendix includes several other
variations.

In the first model the discounted

stream of utility is maximized where utility
depends on consumption and pollution.

The

utility function is assumed to be for the
211

society as a whole.

Thus, the maximand is

sion that because pollution can have so very

JoU(C,P)ert dt where C stands for consumption,
P stands for pollution and r is the discount

many different impacts, a central authority

rate.

other words, there is no simple pollution

Output is either consumed, used as

capital to produce more output or used as
capital to control pollution.

model which covers all of the cases.

Pollution is

produced in fixed proportion to output.

The final paper under consideration here is
by Reed and Hoag (15).

in which air quality standards are imposed
The

question is whether ambient air standards
have the same impact as effluent standards.
Again optimal control techniques are used

Consump

and the results are analyzed in the context
of phase diagram.
For this problem the

Age.

Age, the second steady state

maximand is the sum of the firms' profit.

equilibrium, no capital is devoted to pollu

The authors conclude that effluent standards
and ambient air standards can.achieve the

tion control so that capital accumulation and
consumption will be higher than under the
Golden Age case.

They examine a model

on a region consisting of two firms.

ed to pollution control and some capital is
devoted to producing more output.
Pollution
levels are below what they would be in the

In the Murky

include a discussion of how regulation by a
central authority would have changed the

called the Golden Age, some capital is devot

tion will be lower than in the Murky

It

results of their analysis.

and necessary conditions before the maximum
can be obtained. Two steady state solutions
appear to be possible.
In the first case,

Age," to be discussed next.

In

would have been desirable for this paper to

Equa

tions governing the movement of the capital
stock and the stock of pollution are given

"Murky

js needed to oversee pollution control.

These are the only solutions

the model generates. Which equilibria will be
attained depends upon the initial values of K
and P.

same goal but only if effluent standards are
not selectively applied. The main fault of
this model is that the model does not include
a consumption section.

The appropriate maxi

mand should be, in fact, utility not profit.
The second model-reported by Keeler, Spence
and Zeckhauser uses labor as the only factor

In this section we have examined several

of production and the maximand takes a separ-

models which deal with pollution and growth.
The primary focus of these papers is upon

^kle form.

Some labor is used to produce a

the level of pollution and the growth issue

pollutant and the remaining labor used in the
production of consumption goods.

has generally received secondary considera

The pollu

tion.

tion is also an intermediate product in the

pollution control may interfer with growth

production of consumption. The authors point
to DDT as an example. Pollution is a stock

depending upon the specification of the
model.

variable which moves over time and can only
be reduced by natural decay.

The models, however, do indicate that

5.

Again optimal

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

methods are used and the necessary
conditions for a maximum are used to generate
a phase diagram analysis of the problem.

The major objective of this paper is to

Whether or not the optimal path moves toward

Several points appear to stand out when this

the steady state or not depends on the initial

issue is examined.

review the interface between economic models
and policy dealing with environmental issues.
Before the development of

value for pollution and the relative strengths

policy, it is necessary to understand the

of the forces moving pollution and its social

concept of optimality in the context of
social goals and maximization. Yet the

price (measured in utility terms).

Again the

results of the model depend upon the specifi
cation of the utility function. The extent

question of optimality can only be considered

to which the above results could be replicated
with a more general utility function is not

model since the basic issue involved is what

clear.

ing this condition, it seems clear that

in the framework of a theoretical economic

The authors suggest in their conclu
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should be rather than what is.

In recogniz

elements included in such a model are of
central importance.

4.

The choice between

trols and Economic Growth," Journal of

static and dynamic models, pollution measured

Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April,
1974) pp. 414-417.

either by a stock variable or a flow variable
will, in turn, provide different conclusions

5.

concerning the optimal conditions.

Dales, J.H., Pollution, Property and
Prices, (Toronto:
Press, 1968).

The current policy tools available have vari
ous shortcomings.

Converse, Alvin 0., "Environmental Con

6.

In particular, it appears

University of Toronto

D'Arge, R.C. and K.C. Kogiku, "Economic

that the partial equilibrium nature of the

Growth and the Environment," The Review

tools need to be recognized.

of Economic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 121

To obtain oper

(January, 1973) p p . 61-78.

ational policies, it is becoming increasingly
7.

evident that the models which assume a simple

Dorfmari, Robert, "Economics of Pollution,"

downward transmission of rules that have been

Paper and Proceeding of the American

determined by regulatory agencies alone are

Economic Association, Vol. 63, No. 2 (May,
1973) pp. 253-256.

naive.

The participation by the regulated
8.

parties in such decisions and the resulting

Keeler, Emmett, Michael Spence and

"bargained" solution needs to be recognized

Richard Zeckhauser, "The Optimal Control

in the initial models.

of Pollution," Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 4, No.

The growth and pollution literature suggests

9.

that growth may be curtailed if resources are
used to abate pollution.

Standards," Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. 6
(November, 1971) p p . 983-995.
10. Kwerel, Evan, "To Tell the Truth:

Further, there is

a paucity of models which includes pollution
controls in the context of growth.

It is

Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollu

reasonably obvious that the difficult issue

tion Control," Review of Economic Studies,

of developing a growth model which includes

Vol. 44, No. 138 (October, 1977) pp. 595-

an accurate representation of the measurement

601.

of pollution and pollution regulations all set
in a general equilibrium environment which
regulated firms with meaningful policy content
is beyond the scope of current techniques.

Policy Instruments for Pollution Control,"

some feeling of how growth and pollution

Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall,

interact.

1976) pp. 589-613.
13. Menz,
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